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Optimizing the placement of tap positions and guess and
determine cryptanalysis with variable sampling
S. Hodzˇic´, E. Pasalic, and Y. Wei∗†
Abstract
1 In this article an optimal selection of tap positions for certain LFSR-based encryption
schemes is investigated from both design and cryptanalytic perspective. Two novel algo-
rithms towards an optimal selection of tap positions are given which can be satisfactorily
used to provide (sub)optimal resistance to some generic cryptanalytic techniques applicable
to these schemes. It is demonstrated that certain real-life ciphers (e.g. SOBER-t32, SFINKS
and Grain-128), employing some standard criteria for tap selection such as the concept of
full difference set, are not fully optimized with respect to these attacks. These standard
design criteria are quite insufficient and the proposed algorithms appear to be the only
generic method for the purpose of (sub)optimal selection of tap positions. We also extend
the framework of a generic cryptanalytic method called Generalized Filter State Guessing
Attacks (GFSGA), introduced in [26] as a generalization of the FSGA method, by applying
a variable sampling of the keystream bits in order to retrieve as much information about the
secret state bits as possible. Two different modes that use a variable sampling of keystream
blocks are presented and it is shown that in many cases these modes may outperform the
standard GFSGA mode. We also demonstrate the possibility of employing GFSGA-like at-
tacks to other design strategies such as NFSR-based ciphers (Grain family for instance) and
filter generators outputting a single bit each time the cipher is clocked. In particular, when
the latter scenario is considered, the idea of combining GFSGA technique and algebraic at-
tacks appears to be a promising unified cryptanalytic method against NFSR-based stream
ciphers.
Index terms— Stream ciphers, Filter generators, Generalized filter state guessing attacks,
Tap positions, Algebraic attacks.
1 Introduction
Certain hardware oriented symmetric-key encryption schemes employ two basic primitives for
generating keystream sequences, namely a linear feedback shift register (LFSR) and a nonlinear
Boolean function. The LFSR is mainly used for storing the state bits and for providing the
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samir.hodzic@famnit.upr.si, enes.pasalic6@gmail.com).
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1A part of this paper, related to algorithms for finding an optimal placement of tap positions, was presented
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inputs to the Boolean function, which in turn processes these inputs to output a single bit as a
part of the keystream sequence. For a greater throughput, a vectorial Boolean function, say F ,
may be used instead to provide several output bits at the time, thus F : GF (2)n −→ GF (2)m.
Nonlinear filter generator is a typical representative of a hardware oriented design in stream
ciphers. It consists of a single linear feedback shift register (LFSR) and a nonlinear function
F : GF (2)n −→ GF (2)m that processes a fixed subset of n stages of the LFSR. This fixed subset
of the LFSR’s cells is usually called the taps.
The resistance of nonlinear filter generators against various cryptanalytic attacks, such as
(fast) correlation attacks [16, 25, 19], algebraic attacks [5, 6, 17], probabilistic algebraic attacks
[4, 23], attacks that take the advantage of the normality of Boolean functions [20] etc., mainly
depends on the choice of the filtering function F . The design rules for ensuring good security
margins against these attacks are more or less known today. Nevertheless, guess and determine
cryptanalysis is a powerful cryptanalytic tool against these schemes whose efficiency is irrelevant
of the cryptographic properties of the filtering function (the same applies to time-memory-data
trade-off attacks [3], [12], [13]) but rather to the selection of LFSR: its size, primitive polynomial
used and tapping sequence (tap positions used to supply F with the inputs). The main goal of the
guess and determine cryptanalysis, when applied to these schemes, is to recover the secret state
bits contained in the LFSR by guessing a certain portion of these bits and exploiting the structure
of the cipher. The term structure here mainly refers to the tap positions of LFSR used to provide
the inputs to F and to some fixed positions of LFSR for implementing a linear recursion through
the primitive connection polynomial. For the first time, it was explicitly stated in [9] that the
choice of tap sequence may play more significant role than the optimization of F in the context of
inversion attacks introduced in [9], see also [8, 10]. To protect the cipher from inversion attacks
a full positive difference set was employed in [9], where a set of positive integers Γ = {i1, . . . , in}
is called a full positive difference set if all the positive pairwise differences between its elements
are distinct. These sets are, for instance, used in the design of self-orthogonal convolutional
codes.
The basic idea behind the attacks similar to inversion attacks is to exploit the shift of the
secret state bits that are used as the input to the filtering function. To understand this assume
that we sample the keystream bits at suitable time instances so that a portion of the secret bits
that are used in the previous sampling instance appear again as (part of) the input (at different
positions) to the filtering function. Provided the knowledge of the output, this information then
significantly reduces the uncertainty about the remaining unknown inputs. The designers, well
aware of the fact that a proper tap selection plays an important role in the design, mainly use
some standard (heuristic) design rationales such as taking the differences between the positions
to be prime numbers (if possible), the taps are distributed over the whole LFSR etc.. Intuitively,
selecting the taps at some consecutive positions of the LFSR should be avoided (see also [1]), and
similarly placing these taps at the positions used for the realization of the feedback connection
polynomial is not a good idea either.
Even though a full positive difference set is a useful design criterion which ensures that there
are no repetitions of several input bits, it is quite insufficient criterion which does not prevent
from the attacks such as GFSGA (Generalized Filter State Guessing Attack) introduced in [26].
For instance, assume for simplicity that the inputs to the filtering function are taken at tap
positions I = {3, 6, 12, 24} of the employed LFSR, thus our filtering function takes four inputs,
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i.e., n = 4. It is easily verified that all the differences are distinct and the set of (all possible)
differences is DI = {ij − ik : ij , ik ∈ I, ij > ik} = {3, 6, 9, 12, 18, 21}. Nevertheless, all these
numbers being multiple of 3 would enable an efficient application of GFSGA-like cryptanalysis
since the information about the previous states would be maximized.
Another criterion considered in the literature, aims at ensuring that a multiset of differences
of the tap positions is mutually coprime. This means, that for a given set of tap positions
I = {i1, i2, . . . , in} of an LFSR of length L (thus 1 ≤ i1 < i2 < . . . < in ≤ L) all the elements in
the difference set DI = {ij − ik : ij , il ∈ I, ij > ik} are mutually coprime. This condition, which
would imply an optimal resistance to GFSGA-like methods, is easily verified to be impossible
to satisfy (taking any two odd numbers their difference being even would prevent from taking
even numbers etc.). Therefore, only the condition that the consecutive distances are coprime
appears to be reasonable, that is, the elements of D = {ij+1− ij : ij ∈ I} are mutually coprime.
An exhaustive search is clearly infeasible, since in real-life applications to select (say) n = 20
tap positions for a driving LFSR of length 256 would give
(256
20
)
= 298 possibilities to test for
optimality.
This important issue of finding (sub)optimal solutions for selecting tap positions, given the
input size n and the length L of the driving LFSR, appears to be highly neglected in the
literature. Certain criteria for the choice of tap positions was firstly mentioned in [9] but a more
comprehensive treatment of this issue was firstly addressed recently in [22], where two algorithms
for the purpose of selecting taps (sub)optimally were presented. These algorithms were used
in [22] to show that the selection of tap positions in real-life stream ciphers such as SOBER-
t32 [11] and SFINKS [27] could have been (slightly) improved to ensure a better resistance of
these ciphers to GFSGA-like cryptanalysis. For self-completeness and since this manuscript
extends the work in [22], the above mentioned algorithms and the theoretical discussion for
their derivation is also given, though in a slightly suppressed form. The emphasis is given to
the construction of algorithms and their relation to the criteria for tap selection proposed in
[9]. It is shown that these criteria are embedded in our algorithms but they are not sufficient
for protecting the considered encryption schemes against GFSGA-like methods adequately. In
particular, the selection of tap positions for Grain-128 cipher is far from being optimized allowing
for a significant improvement of its resistance to GFSGA-like attacks as shown in Section 5.
Thus, these algorithms appear to be the only known efficient and generic method for the purpose
of selecting tap positions (sub)optimally.
Another goal of this manuscript is to further extend the GFSGA framework by considering a
variable mode of sampling which was not addressed in FSGA [24] or GFSGA [26]. For a better
understanding of the differences between various modes we give a brief description of the known
modes, thus FSGA and GFSGA, and discuss our extended mode of GFSGA which we describe
later in more detail. The basic idea behind FSGA is to recover secret state bits by reducing
the preimage space of the filtering function F : GF (2)n −→ GF (2)m using the knowledge of
previously guessed bits. Since for uniformly distributed F there are 2n−m preimages for any
observed m-bit output block, the attacker may for each choice of 2n−m many possible inputs
(over the whole set of sampling instances) set up an overdefined system of linear equations in
secret state bits. This attack turns out to be successful only for relatively largem, more precisely
for approximately m > n/2. In certain cases, the running time of FSGA may be lower than
the running time of a classical algebraic attack (cf. [24]). Nevertheless, the placement of tap
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positions of a nonlinear filter generator were of no importance for this attack. More precisely,
only one bit of the information was considered to be known from the previous states in the case
of FSGA. The complexity of the attack was significantly improved in [26], where the information
from the neighbouring taps, in the attack named GFSGA (Generalized FSGA), was used for
a further reduction of the preimage space. In particular, the attack complexity of GFSGA is
very sensitive to the placement of taps, which essentially motivated the initiative taken in [22]
for devising the algorithms for computing (sub)optimal choices of tap positions that give the
maximum resistance against GFSGA.
However, even this generalized approach, which takes into account the tap positions of the
driving LFSR, turns out not to be fully optimal. The main reason is that GFSGA works with a
constant sampling rate and its optimal sampling rate can be easily computed given the set of tap
positions. The algorithms themselves, as presented in [22], are designed to select tap positions
that gives the largest resistance to GFSGA with a constant sampling rate. Therefore, a natural
question that arises here regards the impact on the robustness of the cipher if a variable sampling
rate is used instead. This issue is elaborated here by introducing two different modes of GFSGA
with non-constant (variable) sampling rate. These modes are much less dependent on the choice
of tap positions and in many cases their performance is demonstrated through examples to be
better than that of the standard GFSGA.
We notice that the main difficulty, when comparing the performance of these modes theo-
retically, lies in the fact that there are intrinsic trade-offs between the main parameters involved
in the complexity computation, cf. Remark 4. The main reason is that each of these modes
attempt to reduce the preimage space based on the knowledge of some secret state bits that reap-
pear as the inputs, but at the same time these linear equations (describing the known/guessed
secret state bits) have already been used for setting up a system of linear equations to be solved
once the system becomes overdefined. Thus, increasing the number of repeated bits makes a
reduction of the preimage space more significant (less bits needs to be guessed) but at the same
time more sampling is required since the repeated bits do not increase the rank of the system of
linear equations. This is the trade-off that makes the complexity analysis hard and consequently
no theoretical results regarding the performance of the attack modes can be given.
Finally, well aware of the main limitation of GFSGA-like attacks, which are efficiently ap-
plicable to LFSR-based ciphers with filtering function F : GF (2)n → GF (2)m where m > 1, we
briefly discuss their application to single output filtering functions (thus m = 1) and to ciphers
employing nonlinear feedback shift registers (NFSRs). In both cases we indicate that GFSGA
attacks may be adjusted to work satisfactory in these scenarios as well. Most notably, there
might be a great potential in applying GFSGA attacks in combination with other cryptana-
lytic techniques such as algebraic attacks. This possibility arises naturally due to the fact that
GFSGA-like attacks reduce the preimage space of possible inputs to a filtering function using
the knowledge of previous inputs, thus giving rise to the existence of low degree annihilators
defined on a restriction of the filtering function (obtained by keeping fixed a subset of known
input variables). In another direction, when considering NFSR-based ciphers we propose a novel
approach of mounting internal state recovery attacks on these schemes which employs the GF-
SGA sampling procedure but without solving the deduced systems of equations at all. More
precisely, this new type of internal state recovery attack collects the outputs within a certain
sampling window which then enables an efficient recovery of a certain portion of internal state
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bits. This is done by filtering out the wrong candidates based on the knowledge of reduced
preimage spaces that correspond to the observed outputs.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2, some basic definitions regard-
ing Boolean functions and the mathematical formalism behind the structure of nonlinear filter
generators is given. For completeness, a brief overview of FSGA and GFSGA is also given in
this section. Two different modes of GFSGA with variable sampling distance are introduced in
Section 3. The complexity analysis of these modes in terms of the number of repeated state
bit equations is addressed here as well. In Section 4, the performance of different attack modes
and the algorithms for determining a (sub)optimal selection of tap positions are presented. The
possibility of applying GFSGA to single output filtering functions and to NFSR-based ciphers
is discussed in Section 5. Some concluding remarks are given in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
A Boolean function is a mapping from GF (2)n to GF (2), where GF (2) denotes the binary
Galois field and GF (2)n is an n-dimensional vector space spanned over GF (2). A function
f : GF (2)n → GF (2) is commonly represented using its associated algebraic normal form
(ANF) as follows:
f(x1, . . . , xn) =
∑
u∈GF (2)n
λu(
n∏
i=1
xi
ui),
where xi ∈ GF (2), (i = 1, . . . , n), λu ∈ GF (2), u = (u1, . . . , un) ∈ GF (2)
n. A vectorial (multiple
output) Boolean function F (x) is a mapping from GF (2)n to GF (2)m, with m ≥ 1, which
can also be regarded as a collection of m Boolean functions, i.e., F (x) = (f1(x), . . . , fm(x)).
Commonly, F (x) is chosen to be uniformly distributed, that is, #{x ∈ GF (2)n | F (x) = z} =
2n−m, for all z ∈ GF (2)m. In some cases, we also use the notation |A| to denote the cardinality
of the set A. Moreover, for any z = (z1, . . . , zm) ∈ GF (2)
m, we denote the set of preimage values
by Sz = {x ∈ GF (2)
n | F (x) = z}.
2.1 Nonlinear filter generator
A nonlinear filter generator [18] consists of a single LFSR of length L (thus comprising L
memory cells) whose n fixed positions (taps) are used as the inputs to a filtering function
F : GF (2)n → GF (2)m. These m outputs are used as a part of the keystream bits each time the
LFSR is clocked and the internal state is then updated by a transition function. More formally,
(zt1, . . . , z
t
m) = (f1(ℓn(s
t)), . . . , fm(ℓn(s
t))),
where st = (st0, . . . , s
t
L−1) is the secret state of the LFSR at time t. The notation ℓn(s
t) means
that only a fixed subset of n bits of st = (st0, . . . , s
t
L−1) is used as the input to Boolean functions
f1, . . . , fm, and z
t
1, . . . , z
t
m are the corresponding output keystream bits. These fixed n positions
of LFSR, used as the input to F , are called tap positions in the sequel and will be denoted by
I0 = {l1, l2, . . . , ln}.
The LFSR is updated by computing a newly generated (rightmost) bit st+1L as a linear com-
bination of st0, . . . , s
t
L−1 determined by the connection polynomial and then shifting its content
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to the left. That is, its state is updated as (st+11 , . . . , s
t+1
L−1, s
t+1
L ) ←֓ (s
t
0, s
t
1 . . . , s
t
L−1). Due
to linearity of its feedback connection polynomial, at any t ≥ 0 we have ℓn(s
t
0, . . . , s
t
L−1) =
(ψt1(s
0), . . . , ψtn(s
0)), where the linear functions ψti(s
0) =
∑L−1
j=0 a
t
i,js
0
j , (i = 1, . . . , n), are unique
linear combinations of the initial secret state bits s0 = (s00, . . . , s
0
L−1), at time t = 0. The binary
coefficients ati,j above can therefore be efficiently computed from the connection polynomial of
LFSR for all t ≥ 0.
2.2 An overview of FSGA and GFSGA
For self-completeness and due to the close relation with subsequent sections, we briefly describe
the main ideas behind FSGA and its extension GFSGA. For both attacks there is no restriction
on F : GF (2)n → GF (2)m, thus F satisfies all the relevant cryptographic criteria including a
uniform distribution of its preimages. This also indicates a generic nature of GFSGA and the
possibility of improving its performance in case the filtering function is not optimally chosen.
2.3 FSGA description
For any observed keystream block zt = (zt1, . . . , z
t
m) at time t, there are 2
n−m possible inputs
xt ∈ Szt . Moreover, for every guessed preimage x
t = (xt1, . . . , x
t
n) ∈ Szt , one obtains n linear
equations in the initial secret state bits s00, . . . , s
0
L−1 through x
t
i =
∑L−1
j=0 a
t
i,js
0
j , for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The
goal of the attacker is to recover the initial state bits (s00, . . . , s
0
L−1) after obtaining sufficiently
many keystream blocks zt = (zt1, . . . , z
t
m). If the attacker observes the outputs at some time
instances t1, . . . , tc, so that nc > L, then with high probability each system of nc linear equations
will be solvable but only one system will provide a unique and consistent (correct) solution.
There are 2(n−m)c possibilities of choosing c input tuples (xt11 , . . . , x
t1
n ), . . . , (x
tc
1 , . . . , x
tc
n ) from
Szti , and for each such c-tuple a system of nc linear equations in L variables (secret state bits)
is obtained. The complexity of solving a single overdefined system of linear equations with
L variables is about L3 operations. Thus, the complexity of the FSGA is about 2(n−m)cL3
operations, where c ≈ ⌈L
n
⌉.
2.4 GFSGA description
The major difference to FSGA is that the GFSGA method efficiently utilizes the tap po-
sitions of the underlying LFSR. Let the tap positions of the LFSR be specified by the set
I0 = {l1, l2, . . . , ln}, 1 ≤ l1 < l2 < . . . < ln ≤ L. If at any time instance t1, we assume that the
content of the LFSR at these tap positions is given by st1I0 = (s
t1
l1
, . . . , st1ln), then at t = t1+ σ we
have st1+σI0+σ = (s
t1+σ
l1+σ
, . . . , st1+σln+σ), where the notation s
t
I0
means that we only consider the state
bits at tap positions. Notice that the state bits at tap positions at time instance t1+σ, denoted
as st1+σI0+σ, does not necessarily intersect with s
t1
I0
= st1 , thus if the intersection is an empty set
no information from the previous sampling can be used at t1 + σ. The extreme case of a poor
cryptographic design corresponds to the selection I0 = {l1, l2, . . . , ln} = {l1, l1+σ, . . . , ln−1+σ},
thus having li+1 = li + σ for any i = 1, . . . , n − 1. This would imply that at t = t1 + σ, based
on the knowledge of the state bits st1I0 , we would dispose with n − 1 input bits to F and the
unknown n-th input is easily determined upon the observed output.
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Nevertheless, we can always select σ so that at least one bit of information is conveyed.
More formally, if we denote the outputs by zt1 , . . . , ztc at t1, . . . , tc, where ti = t1 + (i − 1)σ
and 1 ≤ σ ≤ (ln − l1), the sampling process at these time instances may give rise to identical
linear equations since the equations xtui =
∑L−1
j=0 a
tu
i,jsj (where 1 ≤ i ≤ n) may be shifted to
xtvl =
∑L−1
j=0 a
tv
i,jsj, for some 1 ≤ i < l ≤ n, 1 ≤ u < v ≤ c. For simplicity, throughout the article
the LFSR state bits at time instance ti are denoted by s
i = (s0+i, . . . , sL−1+i), whereas for the
state bits at tap positions we use the notation sti = (stil1 , . . . , s
ti
ln
).
This mode of the GFSGA attack will be called the GFSGA with a constant sampling step,
or shortly GFSGA. It is of importance to determine how many identical linear equations will
be obtained for all the sampling instances t1, . . . , tc. By introducing k = ⌊
ln−l1
σ
⌋, and for
I0 = {l1, l2, . . . , ln} defined recursively:
I1 = I0 ∩ {l1 + σ, l2 + σ, . . . , ln + σ},
I2 = I1 ∪ {I0 ∩ {l1 + 2σ, l2 + 2σ, . . . , ln + 2σ}},
... (1)
Ik = Ik−1 ∪ {I0 ∩ {l1 + kσ, l2 + kσ, . . . , ln + kσ}},
the analysis in [26] showed that the complexity of the GFSGA is closely related to the parameter
ri = #Ii, where i = 1, . . . , k.
Remark 1 The above notation means that if for instance some i ∈ I1 and therefore i ∈ I0,
then the state bit st2i was used in the previous sampling since it was at position i − σ ∈ I0 at
time t1, where t2 = t1 + σ. The idea is easily generalized for #Ii = ri, where i = 2, . . . , k.
The number of identical equations obtained in [26] is given as follows. If c ≤ k, then in total∑c−1
i=1 ri identical linear equations are obtained, whereas for c > k this number is
∑k
i=1 ri+ (c−
k − 1)rk. Note that in this case rk = rk+1 = · · · = rc−1 due to the definition of k, which simply
guarantees that after k sampling instances the maximum (and constant) number of repeated
equations is attained. Notice that if c ≤ k, then there are
2n−m × 2n−m−r1 × . . . × 2n−m−r(c−1)
possibilities of choosing c input tuples (xt11 , . . . , x
t1
n ), . . . , (x
tc
1 , . . . , x
tc
n ). For each such choice,
a system of nc−
∑c−1
i=1 ri > L linear equations in L state variables can be obtained, where the
number of samples c ensures that the systems of equations are overdefined and there will be a
unique consistent solution to these systems. Consequently, the time complexity of the attack for
c ≤ k, corresponding to solving 2n−m × 2n−m−r1 × . . . × 2n−m−r(c−1) many linear systems, was
estimated as,
T c≤kComp. = 2
n−m × 2n−m−r1 × . . .× 2n−m−r(c−1) × L3, (2)
and similarly, if c > k, the time complexity for c > k was given by
T c>kComp. = 2
n−m × 2n−m−r1 × . . .× 2n−m−rk × 2(n−m−rk)×(c−k−1) × L3. (3)
Notice that there is an intrinsic trade-off between the time complexity and the condition that
nc −
∑c−1
i=1 ri > L (regarding the uniqueness of solution) through the parameters c and ri.
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Indeed, the time complexity is minimized if c is minimized and ri are maximized, but the
condition nc−
∑c−1
i=1 ri > L requires on contrary that c is maximized and ri are minimized, see
also Remark 4.
Remark 2 If n − m − ri ≤ 0, for some i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, then the knowledge of these ri bits
allows the attacker to uniquely identify the exact preimage value from the set of 2n−m possible
preimages, i.e., we assume 2(n−m−ri) = 1 when n−m− ri ≤ 0.
A complexity comparison of FSGA, GFSGA and CAA (Classical algebraic Attack) for certain
choices of tap position was given in [26] and in certain cases the GFSGA mode of attack out-
performed both other methods.
Remark 3 Note that when the GFSGA method is applied, the attacker chooses the sampling
distance σ for which the minimal complexity TComp. of the attack is achieved. This distance is
called an optimal sampling distance, and its calculation is done by checking the complexities of
the attack for all σ ∈ {1, . . . , L}.
3 GFSGA with a variable sampling step
In this section, we describe the GFSGA method with a variable sampling step σ, which we
denote as GFSGA∗. The whole approach is quite similar to GFSGA, the main difference is
that we consider outputs at any sampling distances, i.e., the observed outputs zti−1 and zti
(i = 1, . . . , c) do not necessarily differ by a fixed constant value and consequently the sampling
distances σ1, . . . , σc are not necessarily the same. It turns out that this approach may give a
significant reduction in complexity compared to the standard version of the attack, see Section 4.
We first adopt some notation to distinguish between the two modes. The number of observed
outputs for which an overdefined system is obtained is denoted by c∗, the corresponding number
of repeated bits by R∗ and the attack complexity by T ∗Comp.. The outputs taken at time instances
ti are denoted by w
ti , where we use the variable sampling steps σi so that ti+1 = ti + σi, for
i = 1, 2, . . . , c∗ − 1. These values σi (distances between the sampled outputs), are referred to as
the variable steps (distances). Throughout this article, for easier identification of repeated bits
over observed LFSR states, the state bits s0, s1, . . . are represented via their indices in N, i.e.,
si → (i + 1) ∈ N (i ≥ 0). In other words, the LFSR state bits s
i = (s0+i, s1+i, . . . , sL−1+i) are
treated as a set of integers given by
(s0+i, s1+i, . . . , sL−1+i)↔ {1 + i, 2 + i, . . . , L+ i}. (4)
The purpose of this notation is to simplify the formal definition of LFSR state bits at tap
positions introduced in the previous section. In addition, it allows us to easier track these bits and
to count the number of repeated bits using the standard concepts of union or intersection between
the sets. Henceforth, the LFSR states si we symbolically write as si = {1 + i, 2 + i, . . . , L + i}
(i ≥ 0), and this notation applies to state bits at tap positions sti . For clarity, a few initial steps
of the process of determining the preimage spaces is given in Appendix.
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It is not difficult to see that the equalities (1), used in GFSGA to determine the parameters
ri = #Ii, are special case of the equalities given as:
I∗1 = I0 ∩ {l1 + σ1, l2 + σ1, . . . , ln + σ1} = s
t1 ∩ st2 ,
I∗2 = {s
t1 ∪ st2} ∩ {l1 + (σ1 + σ2), . . . , ln + (σ1 + σ2)} = {s
t1 ∪ st2} ∩ st3 ,
...
I∗j = {s
t1 ∪ . . . ∪ stj} ∩ {l1 +
j∑
i=1
σi, . . . , ln +
j∑
i=1
σi} =
j⋃
i=1
sti ∩ stj+1 ,
...
I∗c∗−1 =
c∗−1⋃
i=1
sti ∩ stc∗ , (5)
where st1 , . . . , stc∗ represents the LFSR state bits at tap positions at time instances t1, . . . , tc∗ .
In general, the number of repeated equations which corresponds to the outputs wt1 , . . . , wtc∗
at variable distances σi (i.e., w
ti+1 = wti+σi), can be calculated as
qj = #I
∗
j = #
{
j⋃
i=1
sti ∩ {st1 +
j∑
i=1
σi}
}
, (6)
where all steps σi are fixed for i = 1, . . . , j and j = 1, . . . , c
∗ − 1. Note that the sets I∗j−1
(j ≥ 1) correspond to outputs wtj (where I∗0 = I0
(4)
= st1). The sampling instances are given
as tj = t1 +
∑j−1
i=1 σi, or tj = tj−1 + σj−1, where tj−1 = t1 +
∑j−2
i=1 σi is fixed. Similarly to the
GFSGA with a constant sampling distance, the attack complexity is estimated as
T ∗Comp. = 2
n−m × 2n−m−q1 × . . .× 2n−m−qc∗−1 × L3. (7)
Remark 2 also applies here, thus if n−m−qj ≤ 0 for some j ∈ {1, . . . , c
∗−1}, then the knowledge
of these qj bits allows the attacker to uniquely identify the exact preimage value of the observed
output, i.e., we have 2(n−m−qj) = 1 when n −m− qj ≤ 0. Notice that if the sampling steps σi
are equal, i.e., they have a constant value σ = σi, for i = 1, 2, . . . , c
∗ − 1, we get qi = ri, c
∗ = c,
R∗ = R and T ∗Comp. = TComp..
Remark 4 It was already mentioned that the analysis of complexity T ∗Comp. appears to be very
difficult, mainly due to the following reasons. For fixed m,n and L, it is clear that there exists a
trade-off between the parameters qj (j = 1, . . . , c
∗ − 1) and c∗. More precisely, for larger values
c∗ we have that 2n−m−qj > 1 which implies the increase of T ∗Comp., unless n−m−qj ≤ 0. For this
reason, the optimal step(s) of the GFSGA attack (whether we consider a constant or variable
mode of the attack) is the one which minimizes c∗ satisfying at the same time the inequality
nc∗ − R∗ > L. Furthermore, in the case of the constant GFSGA mode, the parameter c for
which nc−R > L holds is not known prior to the completion of the sampling process. This also
holds for the variable GFSGA mode, if we fix a sequence of sampling steps in advance. This,
in combination with [22, Remark 3], give more insight how complicated the relation between
parameters m,n,L, qj, c
∗ and T ∗Comp. is.
9
3.1 The number of repeated equations for GFSGA∗
The relation between the number of repeated equations and complexity in the case of GFSGA
has been analyzed in [22], where an alternative method for calculating the number of repeated
equations has been derived. Similarly, in this section we derive an alternative method for
calculating the number of repeated equations for GFSGA∗ (Proposition 2).
For a given set of tap positions I0 = {l1, l2, . . . , ln}, let us consider the set of differences
between the consecutive tap positions, i.e.,
D = { dj | dj = lj+1 − lj, j = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1}.
Based on this set the so-called scheme of all possible differences was defined in [22] as DI0 =
{lj − lk : lj , lk ∈ I0, lj > lk} and used in [22] to calculate the number of repeated equations for
GFSGA.
Proposition 1 [22] Let I0 = {l1, l2, . . . , ln} be a set of tap positions, and let
D = {lj+1 − lj | j = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1} = {d1, d2, . . . , dn−1}.
The number of repeated equations is calculated as
R =
n−1∑
i=1
(c−
1
σ
m∑
k=i
dk), (8)
where σ |
∑m
k=i dk for some m ∈ N, i ≤ m ≤ n − 1 and
1
σ
∑m
k=i dk ≤ c − 1. Moreover, if
1
σ
∑m
k=i dk ≥ c, for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, then (c−
1
σ
∑m
k=i dk) = 0. This means that the repetition
of the same equations (bits) starts to appear after the LFSR state stc.
In the case of GFSGA∗, the scheme of differences can also be used to calculate the number
of repeated equations R∗. However, in this case the calculation is slightly more complicated
compared to GFSGA, due to the fact that we have a variable step of sampling.
To illustrate the difference, let us consider the set of tap positions given by I0 = {3, 5, 10, 14, 16}
(L = 20 and n,m not specified). The corresponding set of consecutive differences is given as
D = {2, 5, 4, 2}. The scheme of all differences related to DI0 is given as:
Table 1: The scheme of all differences for D = {2, 5, 4, 2}.
Col. 1 Col. 2 Col. 3 Col. 4
lj+1 − lj 2 5 4 2
lj+2 − lj 7 9 6
lj+3 − lj 11 11
lj+4 − lj 13
In addition, let us assume that the first two steps of sampling (distances between observed
outputs) are given as: σ1 = 5, σ2 = 2. To find the number of repeated bits (equations), we
use the recursion of the sets I∗k given by relation (5). Even though c
∗ is the number of outputs
for which an overdefined system can be set up, our purpose is to demonstrate the procedure of
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finding repeated bits for σ1, σ2. The computation of the number of repeated bits is as follows:
1) The state bits at tap positions at time t1 correspond to I0 = {l1, l2, l3, l4, l5} = {3, 5, 10, 14, 16},
thus st1 = (s2, s4, s9, s13, s15)
(4)
= I0. Since the first sampling distance σ1 = 5, we consider the
LFSR state st2 = {I0 + σ1} which is given as
st2 = {I0 + 5} = (s7, s9, s14, s18, s20)
(4)
= {8, 10, 15, 19, 21}.
We obtain that I∗1 = s
t1 ∩ st2 = I0 ∩ (I0 + 5) = {10}, which means that 1 = #I
∗
1 = q1 bit is
repeated and found in st2 from the first state st1 = I0.
In terms of the scheme of differences, this repetition corresponds to d2 = l3 − l2 = σ1 = 5,
found as the first entry in Col. 2. In addition, note that d2 = 5 is the only entry in the scheme
of differences DI0 which is equal to σ1. The main difference compared to GFSGA is that in
this case we do NOT consider the divisibility by σ1 in the scheme of differences due to variable
sampling steps.
2) For σ2 = 2, the observed outputs w
t2 and wt3 satisfy wt3 = wt2+σ2 = wt1+σ1+σ2 . The LFSR
state st3 , which corresponds to the output wt3 , is given as st3 = {st2 + σ2} = {s
t1 + (σ1 + σ2)},
and therefore
st3 = {st2 + 2} = (s9, s11, s16, s20, s22) = {10, 12, 17, 21, 23}.
At this position we check whether there are repeated bits from the LFSR state st2 , but also
from the state st1 . To find all bits which have been repeated from the state st2 , we consider
the intersection st3 ∩ st2 = {10, 21}. In addition, the bits which are repeated from the state
st1 are given by the intersection st3 ∩ st1 = {10}. Hence, we have the case that the same bit,
indexed by 10, has been shifted from the state st1 (since σ1 + σ2 = 7 so that 3 + 7=10) and
from st2 (since σ2 = 2) to s
t3 . On the other hand, the intersection corresponding to 21 gives
us an equation that has not been used previously. Thus, the number of known state bits used
in the reduction of the preimage space is 2, and therefore |Swt3 | = 2
n−m−2. In terms of the
scheme of differences, one may notice that we have d1 = l2 − l1 = 2 = σ2 (which refers to
repetition from st2 to st3) and which gives d1 = 2 in Col. 1 and Col. 4. On the other hand,
for d1 + d2 = l3 − l1 = 7 = σ1 + σ2 (which refers to repetition from s
t1 to st3) the repeated bit
is found in the same column, namely Col. 1, and therefore it is not counted. In general, we
conclude here that if we have a matching of σ(2) = d2 and σ
(1) = d1+d2 with some numbers (en-
tries) in the scheme of differences which are in the same column (as we have here d1 = σ
(2) and
d1+ d2 = σ
(1)), we calculate only one repeated bit in total from this column. If there were more
than 2 matchings, the same reasoning applies and thus we would calculate only one repeated bit.
The procedure above may continue for any number of observed outputs at any sampling dis-
tances. For instance, if we consider some sampling step σj (j ≥ 1), then we also need to consider
all sums of the steps σ(j−i) =
∑j
h=j−i σh, for all i = 0, . . . , j−1 (j ≥ 1) and their matchings with
some entries in the scheme of differences. In general, every repeated bit means that some sum(s)
of steps σ(j−i) =
∑j
h=j−i σh, i = 0, . . . , j−1 is equal to some difference
∑m
p=r dp, for somem ∈ N,
over different columns, where r = 1, . . . , n−1 relate to the columns in the scheme of differences.
A total number of repeated bits R∗ is the sum of all repeated bits over observed outputs at
distances σj (j ≥ 1). Note that the method for calculation of the number of repeated bits
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described above actually generalizes Proposition 1, since the use of constant sampling distance
is just a special case of variable sampling.
Proposition 2 Let I0 = {l1, l2, . . . , ln} be a set of tap positions, and let
D = {li+1 − li | i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1} = {d1, d2, . . . , dn−1}.
Denoting σ(j−i) =
∑j
h=j−i σh, i = 0, . . . , j − 1, the number of repeated equations is calculated as
R∗ =
c∗−1∑
j=1
qj =
c∗−1∑
j=1
(
j−1∑
i=0
1
σ(j−i)
m∑
p=r
dp
)
, (9)
where the term 1
σ(j−i)
∑m
p=r dp = 1 if and only if σ
(j−i) =
∑m
p=r dp for some m, r ∈ N, 1 ≤
r ≤ m ≤ n − 1, otherwise it equals 0. If for a fixed r and different numbers m we have more
matchings σ(j−i) =
∑m
p=r dp, then only one bit will be taken in calculation.
Clearly, the numbers m and r depend on the values σ(j−i), i = 0, . . . , j− 1 (j ≥ 1) since we only
consider those numbers m, r ∈ N such that
∑m
p=r dp is equal to σ
(j−i).
3.2 Two specific modes of GFSGA∗
In this section we present two modes of GFSGA∗, which in comparison to GFSGA depend less
on the choice of tap positions. First we start with a general discussion regarding the attack
complexity.
In order to obtain a minimal complexity of the GFSGA∗ attack, it turns out that the main
problem is actually a selection of the cipher outputs. This problem is clearly equivalent to the
problem of selecting the steps σi which gives the minimal complexity T
∗
Comp.. The number of
repeated bits (equations) at time instance ti (for some i > 1) always depends on all previous
sampling points at t1, . . . , ti−1. This property directly follows from (5), i.e., from the fact that
we always check the repeated bits which come from the tap positions of LFSR at time instances
t1, . . . , ti−1. This means that the number of repeated bits qi at time instances ti, given by (6),
always depends on the previously chosen steps σ1, . . . , σi−1. This also implies that we cannot
immediately calculate the number of required keystream blocks c∗ for which the inequality
nc∗ − R∗ > L is satisfied. This inequality can only be verified subsequently, once the sampling
distances and the number of outputs c∗ have been specified. Therefore we pose the following
problem.
Open Problem 1 For a given set of tap positions I0 = {l1, . . . , ln}, without the knowledge of
c∗, determine an optimal sequence of sampling distances σi for which the minimal complexity
T ∗Comp. is achieved.
In what follows we provide two modes of the GFSGA∗ whose performance will be discussed in
Section 4.
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3.3 GFSGA∗(1) mode of attack
In order to minimize the complexity T ∗Comp., one possibility is to maximize the values qj, given
by (6), by choosing suitable σi. However, this approach implies a trade-off between the values
qj and c
∗, since c∗ is not necessarily minimized. More precisely:
1) For the first step 1 ≤ σ1 ≤ L we take a value for which q1 is maximized, i.e., for which the
cardinality
q1 = #{s
t1 ∩ (st1 + σ1)} = #{s
t1 ∩ st2}
is maximized. Without loss of generality, we can take the minimal σ1 for which this holds.
2) In the same way, in the second step we take a value 1 ≤ σ2 ≤ L for which
q2 = #{(s
t1 ∪ st2) ∩ st3} = #{(st1 ∪ st2) ∩ ((st1 + σ1) + σ2)}
is maximized. As we know, the step σ1 here is fixed by the previous step. We continue this
procedure until an overdefined system is obtained.
In other words, the values qj are determined by the maximum function over σi, for 1 ≤ σi ≤ L,
i.e., we choose the steps σi for which we have:
qj = max
1≤σj≤L
#
{
j⋃
i=1
sti ∩ {(st1 +
j−1∑
i=1
σi) + σj}
}
, (10)
where
∑j−1
i=1 σi is fixed and j = 1, . . . , c
∗ − 1. Hence, the function max1≤σj≤L used in (10)
means that we are choosing σi so that the maximal intersection of s
tj+1 with all previous LFSR
states st1 , . . . , stj (in terms of cardinality) is achieved. This mode of GFSGA∗ we denote by
GFSGA∗(1).
3.4 GFSGA∗(2) mode of attack
Another mode of GFSGA∗, based on the use of sampling distances that correspond to the
differences between consecutive tap positions, is discussed in this section. The selection of steps
σi and the calculation of repeated bits is performed as follows..
For a given set of tap positions I0 = {l1, . . . , ln}, let D = {d1, . . . , dn−1} be the corresponding
set of differences between the consecutive tap positions. The sequence of sampling distances σi
between the observed outputs wti and wti+1 is defined as:

σ1+p(n−1) = d1,
σ2+p(n−1) = d2,
...
σn−1+p(n−1) = dn−1,
(11)
for p = 0, 1, 2, . . . . That is, the first n− 1 sampling distances are taking values exactly from the
set D so that σ1 = d1, σ2 = d2, . . . , σn−1 = dn−1. Then, the next n − 1 sampling distances are
again σn = d1, σn+1 = d2, . . . , σ2n−2 = dn−1, and so on. This mode of the GFSGA
∗ we denote
as GFSGA∗(2). For this mode, using Proposition 2, we are able to calculate a lower bound on the
13
number of repeated equations for every sampling step. Recall that at some sampling instance
tj there are some repeated bit(s) if and only if σ
(j−i) =
∑j
h=j−i σh, i = 0, 1, . . . , j − 1, is equal
to some
∑m
p=r dp = lm − lr, for some 1 ≤ r ≤ m ≤ n − 1. In addition, if in the same column in
the scheme of differences (which is equivalent to considering a fixed r and all the values m ≥ r)
we have more matchings σ(j−i) =
∑m
p=r dp, then only one bit is counted.
Hence, taking the first n − 1 sampling steps to be σ1 = d1, σ2 = d2, . . . , σn−1 = dn−1, the
scheme of differences (constructed for our set D = {d1, . . . , dn−1}) and Proposition 2 imply that
q1 ≥ 1, since at least σ1 = d1 is in Col. 1. Then q2 ≥ 2, since we have σ
(2−0) = σ(2) = σ2 is
equal to d2 in Col. 2., and σ
(2−1) = σ(1) = σ1+ σ2 is equal to d1+ d2 in Col. 1. Continuing this
process we obtain q3 ≥ 3, . . . , qn−1 ≥ n− 1, which in total gives at least
1 + 2 + . . .+ (n− 1) =
n(n− 1)
2
repeated equations for the first n− 1 observed outputs. In the same way, at least n(n−1)2 of bits
are always repeated if further sampling at n − 1 time instances is performed in accordance to
(11). For instance, when p = 1 in (11) we have σn = d1. In general, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1 and p ≥ 0
we have qi+p(n−1) ≥ i, where the sampling steps are defined by (11). We conclude this section
with the following remarks.
Remark 5 Both GFSGA∗(1) and GFSGA
∗
(2) depend less on the placement of the tap positions
in comparison to GFSGA. Indeed, for both modes the sampling distances σi are selected with
respect to a given placement of tap positions but regardless of what this placement in general
might be. These modes are therefore more useful for cryptanalytic purposes rather than to be
used in the design of an optimal allocation of tap positions (given the length of LFSR and the
number of taps).
Remark 6 In the case of GFSGA where we have equal distances between the observed outputs,
one may notice that the sequence of numbers ri = #Ii is always an increasing sequence. On
the other hand, the sequence of numbers qi = #I
∗
i for GFSGA
∗ may not be increasing at all.
In connection to Open problem 1, neither GFSGA∗(1) nor GFSGA
∗
(2) automatically provides
an optimal sequence of steps σi (which would imply the minimization of T
∗
Comp.). This means
that there exist cases in which any of the modes GFSGA, GFSGA∗(1) and GFSGA
∗
(2) may
outperform the other two (cf. Table 3 and Table 4, Section 4.2).
4 Comparision between GFSGA, GFSGA∗(1) and GFSGA
∗
(2)
In this section we compare the performance of the three GFSGA modes when the tap positions
are selected (sub)optimally by using the algorithms originally proposed in [22]. Moreover, the
case when the set of differences D forms a full positive difference set is also considered and
compared to the algorithmic approach.
4.1 Overview of the algorithms for tap selection
As briefly mentioned in the introduction the concept of a full difference set, which ensures that
all the entries in the set of all pairwise differences are different, is not a very useful criterion
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for tap selection. This is especially true when GFSGA-like cryptanalysis is considered as shown
in Section 4.2. The same applies to the set of consecutive differences which may be taken to
have mutually coprime entries which still does not ensure a sufficient cryptographic strength.
Thus, there is a need for a more sophisticated algorithmic approach for designing (sub)optimally
the placement of n tap positions for a given length L of the LFSR. The main idea behind the
algorithms originally proposed in [22], presented below for self-completeness, is the use of the
standard GFSGA mode with a constant sampling rate for the purpose of finding (sub)optimal
placement of tap positions.
The proposed algorithms for the selection of tap positions use the design rationales that
maximize the resistance of the cipher to the standard mode of GFSGA. Instead of specifying the
set I0, both methods aim at constructing the set D of consecutive differences which gives a low
number of repeated equations (confirmed by computer simulations) for any constant sampling
distance σ, which implies a good resistance to GFSGA-like methods. As an illustration of
the above mentioned algorithms several examples were provided in [22] and in particular an
application to the stream cipher SOBER-t32 [11] and SFINKS [27] were analyzed in details.
In what follows, we briefly recall the algorithms from [22] and then we discuss their structural
properties related to the presented modes of GFSGA as well as to the criteria for tap selection
proposed in [9] which provides a resistance to inversion attacks.
In both algorithms a quality measure for the choice of tap positions is the request that the
optimal step (see Remark 3) of the GFSGA attack is as small as possible. The selection of tap
positions itself is governed by the general rule, which is achieving co-prime differences between
the tap positions (Step A in [22]) together with distributing taps all over the register (thus
maximizing
∑n−1
i=1 di ≤ L−1, where di = li+1− li, I0 = {l1, . . . , ln} being a set of tap positions).
The first algorithm is designed to deal with situations when the size D is not large (say
#D ≤ 10). In this case the algorithm performs an exhaustive search of all permutations of the
set D (Step B in [22]) and gives as an output a permutation which ensures a maximal resistance
to GFSGA. The complexity of this search is estimated as O(n! ·K), where K corresponds to
the complexity of calculation TComp. for all possible σ.
Remark 7 As mentioned in [22], to measure the quality of a chosen set of differences D with
respect to the maximization of TComp. over all σ, the computer simulations indicate that an
optimal ordering of the set D implies a small value of an optimal sampling distance σ. When
choosing an output permutation (cf. Step 5 below), we always consider both σ and TComp. though
σ turns out to be a more stable indicator of the quality of a chosen set D.
For practical values of L, usually taken to be L = 256, the time complexity of the above
algorithm becomes practically infeasible already for n > 10. Using the previous algorithm, the
second algorithm proposed in [22] regards a case when #D is large. To reduce its factorial time
complexity, we use the above algorithm only to process separately the subsets of the multiset
D within the feasibility constraints imposed on the cardinalities of these subsets. The steps of
this modified algorithm are given as follows.
STEP 1: Choose a set X by Step A, where #X < #D for which Step B is feasible;
STEP 2: Find the best ordering of X using the algorithm in Step B for
LX = 1 +
∑
xi∈X
xi < L and mX = ⌊#X ·
m
n−1⌋;
STEP 3: Choose a set Y by Step A, where #Y < #D for which Step B is feasible;
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STEP 4: “Generate” a list of all permutations of the elements in Y ;
STEP 5: Find a permutation (Yp) from the above list such that for a fixed set X, the
new set YpX obtained by joining X to Yp, denoted by YpX (with the parameters
LYpX = 1 +
∑
xi∈X
xi +
∑
yi∈Yp
yi ≤ L and mYpX = ⌊#YpX ·
m
n−1⌋), allows a
small optimal step σ, in the sense of Remark 7;
STEP 6: If such a permutation, resulting in a small value of σ, does not exist in Step 5,
then back to Step 3 and choose another set Y ;
STEP 7: Update the set X ← YpX, and repeat the steps 3 - 5 by adjoining new sets Yp
until #YpX = n− 1;
STEP 8: Return the set D = YpX.
Remark 8 The parameters LX and mX are derived by computer simulations, where LX essen-
tially constrains the set X and mX keeps the proportionality between the numbers m,#X and
#D = n− 1.
The main question which arises here is whether the performance of the mentioned algorithms
above can be improved by using some of the new presented modes in the previous section.
Unfortunately, the main reasons why GFSGA can not be replaced by GFSGA∗(1) or GFSGA
∗
(2)
are the following:
a. Apart from Remark 5, due to their low dependency on the choice of tap positions, neither
GFSGA∗(1) nor GFSGA
∗
(2) mode (through Proposition 2) simply do not provide enough
information that can be used to construct the tap positions with high resistance to GFSGA
attacks in general. It is clear that the presented algorithms above only give a (sub)optimal
placement of tap positions due to impossibility to test exhaustively all permutations of D
and additionally to perform testing of all difference sets D is infeasible as well. An optimal
placement of tap positions providing the maximum resistance to GFSGA attacks leads us
back to Open problem 1.
b. One may notice that the main role of the constant step σ used in the design of the algorithm
in [22] is to reduce the repetition of bits in general, since σ may take any value from 1
to L. This reduction of the repeated bits is significantly larger when using the constant
step than any variable step of sampling in GFSGA∗(1) or GFSGA
∗
(2), due to their specific
definitions given by (10) and (11).
Notice that some criteria for tap selection regarding the resistance to the inversion attacks were
proposed in [9]. The difference between the first and last tap position should be near or equal to
L−1, which turns out to be an equivalent criterion of maximization of the sum
∑n−1
i=1 di ≤ L−1,
as mentioned above. Generalized inversion attacks [10] performed on filter generators, with the
difference between the first and last tap position equal to M (= ln − l1), have the complexity
approximately 2M [10]. Hence, taking that
∑n−1
i=1 di = L − 1, where di = li+1 − li (with tap
positions I0 = {l1, . . . , ln}), one of the criteria which thwarts (generalized) inversion attacks is
easily satisfied.
In addition, one may also use a λth-order full positive difference set [9] for tap selection,
that is, the set of tap positions I0 = {l1, . . . , ln} with as small as possible parameter λ =
max1≤σ≤M |I0∩(I0+σ)|. If λ = 1, then I0 is a standard full positive difference set. As illustrated
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in Table 4, to provide a high resistance to GFSGA-like attacks, the set of tap positions may be
a λth-order full positive difference set with higher values of λ. Note that in the case of inversion
attacks, smaller λ is required. In other words, (λth-order) full positive difference sets do not
provide the same resistance to inversion attacks and GFSGA-like attacks, when the selection of
tap positions is considered.
4.2 Full positive difference sets versus algorithms in [22]
In this section, we compare the performance of the three GFSGA modes by applying these
attacks to a cipher whose tap positions are chosen using the algorithms in [22] and in the case
the tap positions form suitably chosen full positive difference sets, respectively. We analyze the
resistance to GFSGA attacks (using these two methods for tap selection) and conclude that
full positive difference sets do not give an optimal placement of tap positions, i.e., they do not
provide a maximal resistance to GFSGA-like cryptanalysis.
It is not difficult to see that the set of rules valid for the algorithms in [22] essentially require
that we choose a set of tap positions I0 so that the corresponding set of consecutive differences
D, apart from having different elements (possibly all), is also characterized by the property that
these differences are coprime and in a specific order. The situation when taps are not chosen
optimally, implying a high divisibility of the elements in D, is illustrated in Table 2. Denoting
by TComp., T
∗
Comp.(1)
and T ∗Comp.(2) the running time of the GFSGA, GFSGA
∗
(1) and GFSGA
∗
(2)
mode, respectively, it is obvious that GFSGA is superior to other modes in most of the cases,
as indicated in Table 2. In Table 3, we compare the performance of the three modes, if the tap
Table 2: Complexity comparision of all three GFSGA modes for ”bad” tap choices.
L (n,m) D TComp. T
∗
Comp.(1)
T ∗
Comp.(2)
80 (9,2) {12, 3, 6, 12, 6, 4, 24, 12} 243.97 267.97 262.97
120 (11,3) {5, 10, 15, 4, 5, 10, 5, 15, 20, 25} 237.7 263 269.7
160 (15,6) {14, 7, 3, 14, 7, 7, 14, 7, 14, 28, 7, 14, 14, 7} 232.97 232.97 250.97
positions (sets of differences D) are chosen suboptimally according to rules and algorithms in
[22]. Thus, if the tap positions are chosen according to the rules and algorithms in [22], it turns
Table 3: Complexity comparison of GFSGA modes - algorithmic selection of taps.
L (n,m) D TComp. T
∗
Comp.(1)
T ∗
Comp.(2)
80 (7,2) {5, 13, 7, 26, 11, 17} 269.97 263.97 259.97
120 (13,3) {5, 7, 3, 13, 6, 11, 5, 11, 7, 13, 21, 17} 299.7 2104 278.7
160 (17,6) {5,11,4,3,7,9,1,2,23,15,5, 13, 7, 26, 11, 17} 286.97 279.97 241.97
200 (21,7) {3, 7, 9, 13, 18, 7, 9, 1, 2, 9, 1, 2, 23, 15, 5, 13, 7, 26, 11, 17} 2108.9 296.93 268.93
out that GFSGA∗(1) and GFSGA
∗
(2) modes are more efficient than GFSGA.
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In Table 4, we compare the resistance of a nonlinear filter generator (specified by L, n andm)
to different GFSGA modes regarding the design rationales behind the choice of tap positions.
Namely, for the same cipher (in terms of the parameters above), the attack complexities are
evaluated for tap positions that form (suitable) full positive differences sets and, respectively,
for the choices of tap positions given in Table 3 (with a slight modification adopted for different
parameters L, n and m). In general, the algorithmic approach gives a higher resistance to
GFSGA-like cryptanalysis.
Table 4: Complexity comparision - full positive difference sets versus algorithmic choice.
L (n,m) Tap positions - Full positive difference sets TComp. T
∗
Comp.(1)
T ∗Comp.(2)
80 (7,2) {1, 3, 8, 14, 22, 23, 26} 235.97 237.97 257.97
120 (13,3) {1, 3, 6, 26, 38, 44, 60, 71, 86, 90, 99, 100, 107} 286.72 290.72 295.72
160 (15,4) {1, 5, 21, 31, 58, 60, 63, 77, 101, 112, 124, 137, 145, 146, 152} 296.97 2105.97 2116.97
200 (17,5) {1, 6, 8, 18, 53, 57, 68, 81, 82, 101, 123, 139, 160, 166, 169, 192, 200} 2113.93 2123.93 2132.93
L (n,m) Set of consecutive differences D -algorithmic choice λ TComp. T
∗
Comp.(1)
T ∗Comp.(2)
80 (7,2) {5, 13, 7, 26, 11, 17} 1 269.97 263.97 259.97
120 (13,3) {5, 7, 3, 13, 6, 11, 5, 11, 7, 13, 21, 17} 3 299.7 2104 278.7
160 (15,4) {5, 3, 7, 1, 9, 17, 15, 23, 5, 13, 7, 26, 11, 17} 3 2114.97 2124.97 2101.97
200 (17,5) {7, 13, 10, 13, 7, 1, 9, 17, 15, 23, 5, 13, 7, 26, 11, 17} 3 2120.93 2120.93 2113.93
Remark 9 Table 4 also indicates that an algorithmic choice of tap positions may provide sig-
nificantly better resistance against GFSGA-like attacks compared to full positive difference sets
(for various parameters n,m and L).
4.3 Further examples and comparisons
In this section we provide a few examples which illustrate the sampling procedure and speci-
fication of repeated bits for the GFSGA∗(1) and GFSGA
∗
(2) modes. In both cases we consider
the set of consecutive differences D = {5, 13, 7, 26, 11, 17} (most of the differences being prime
numbers) which corresponds to the set of tap positions I0 = {1, 6, 19, 26, 52, 63, 80}. We first
consider the GFSGA∗(1) mode.
Example 1 Let the set of tap positions be given by I0 = s
t1 = {1, 6, 19, 26, 52, 63, 80}, where
L = 80 and F : GF (2)7 → GF (2)2 (n = 7, m = 2). The set I0 is chosen according to the
algorithms in [22] and it is most likely an optimal choice of tap positions for the given parameters
L, n and m. Recall that the variable sampling steps σi for GFSGA
∗
(1) are determined by the
maximum function used in relation (10). In Table 5, using the relation (10) we identify the
repeated state bits until the inequality nc∗ > L + R∗ is satisfied for some c∗. The total number
of repeated equations over all observed outputs is R∗ =
∑c∗−1
k=1 qk = 67, where the number of
outputs is c∗ = 22. Note that the first observed output wt1 has the preimage space of full size,
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i Sets I∗i (where (k + 1)↔ sk) qi σi
1 {6} 1 5
2 {19,24} 2 13
3 {26, 31, 44} 3 7
4 {52, 57, 70, 77} 4 26
5 {63, 68, 81, 88, 114} 5 11
6 {80, 85, 98, 105, 131, 142} 6 17
7 {85, 103} 2 5
8 {114, 147} 2 11
9 {131, 164, 175} 3 17
10 {118, 136} 2 5
11 {125, 138} 2 2
12 {131, 136, 182} 3 11
13 {138, 143, 156} 3 7
14 {164, 169, 182, 189} 4 26
15 {175, 180, 193, 200, 226} 5 11
16 {192, 197, 210, 217, 243, 254} 6 17
17 {197, 215} 2 5
18 {199, 217} 2 2
19 {210, 215, 261} 3 11
20 {217, 222, 235} 3 7
21 {243, 248, 261, 268} 4 26
Table 5: Repeated bits attained by sampling steps σi defined by (10).
and thus there are no repeated bits. Since we chose st1 = I0, the positions of repeated bits at the
corresponding tap positions can be found and calculated as follows:
• The step σ1 = 5 gives the maximal intersection between s
t1 and st2 = {st1 + 5} =
{6, 11, 24, 31, 57, 68, 85}, i.e., we have
max
1≤σ1≤80
#{st1 ∩ (st1 + σ1)} = max
1≤σ1≤80
#{st1 ∩ st2} = {6},
which yields q1 = 1. The size of the preimage space is |Swt2 | = 2
n−m−q1 = 24.
• Assuming the knowledge of xt2 ∈ Swt2 and x
t1 ∈ Swt1 , we search for an optimal shift σ2
of st2 so that q2 = #{{s
t1 ∪ st2} ∩ {st2 + σ2}} is maximized. Note that at this point,
{st1 + σ1} = s
t2 is fixed. This gives σ2 = 13 and q2 = 2. The set of repeated bits is
max
1≤σ2≤80
#{{st1 ∪ st2} ∩ {st2 + σ2}} = {19, 24},
since st3 = {st2 + σ2} = {19, 24, 37, 44, 70, 81, 98}. The preimage space has the cardinality
|Swt3 | = 2
n−m−q2 = 23.
In this way, we can completely determine the preimage spaces and the positions of the repeated
bits. Since for i ∈ {5, 6, 15, 16} we have qi ≥ n − m = 5, then 2
n−m−qi = 1 (by convention).
Once the other values qj have been computed, for j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 21}\{5, 6, 15, 16}, the attack
complexity can be estimated as
T ∗Comp.(1) = 2
n−m × 2n−m−q1 × . . . × 2n−m−q21 × L3 ≈ 263.97.
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In the case of GFSGA, an optimal choice of the sampling distance (cf. Remark 3) is any
σ ∈ {1, 13, 37}. Each of these sampling steps requires c = 16 observed outputs and gives R = 24
repeated equations, where the set of all repeated bits is given by
{r1, r2, . . . , r15} = {0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4}.
The values ri = 0, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, mean that the corresponding sets Ii are empty. The attack
complexity of GFSGA is then estimated as TComp. ≈ 2
69.97.
Example 2 Now, for the same function F and the set of tap positions I0 = s
t1 (or the set of
differences D = {5, 13, 7, 26, 11, 17}), we illustrate the GFSGA∗(2) mode. In Table 6, we show
all repeated bits for the sampling steps σi of the GFSGA
∗
(2) mode, which are defined by relation
(11). Recall that the steps σi in this case are defined so that every n − 1 = 6 outputs are at
distances di ∈ D. By formula (7), the complexity of GFSGA
∗
(2) is estimated as T
∗
Comp.(2)
≈ 259.97,
Table 6: Repeated bits attained by sampling steps σi defined by (11).
i Sets I∗i (where (k + 1)↔ sk) qi σi
1 {6} 1 5
2 {19,24} 2 13
3 {26, 31, 44} 3 7
4 {52, 57, 70, 77} 4 26
5 {63, 68, 81, 88, 114} 5 11
6 {80, 85, 98, 105, 131, 142} 6 17
7 {85, 103} 2 5
8 {98, 103} 2 13
9 {105, 110, 123} 3 7
10 {131, 136, 149, 156} 4 26
11 {142, 147, 160, 167, 193} 5 11
12 {159, 164, 177, 184, 210, 221} 6 17
13 {164, 182} 2 5
14 {177, 182} 2 13
15 {184, 189, 202} 3 7
16 {210, 215, 228, 235} 4 26
17 {221, 226, 239, 246, 272} 5 11
18 {238, 243, 256, 263, 289, 300} 6 17
19 {243, 261} 2 5
20 {256, 261} 2 13
21 {263, 268, 281} 3 7
and thus this mode outperforms both GFSGA and GFSGA∗(1). The total number of repeated
equations in this case is given by R∗ = 72, for c∗ = 22 observed outputs. Notice that both modes
GFSGA∗(1) and GFSGA
∗
(2) required in total 22 outputs to construct an overdefined system of
linear equations (nc∗ > L+R∗).
5 Employing GFSGA in other settings
The main limitation of GFSGA-like attacks is their large complexity when applied to standard
filtering generators that only output a single bit each time the cipher is clocked. In addition, this
generic method cannot be applied in a straightforward manner in the cryptanalysis of ciphers
that use NFSRs. In this section, we discuss the possibility of improving the efficiency and/or
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applicability of GFSGA with variable sampling step for the above mentioned scenarios. It will
be demonstrated that GFSGA with variable sampling step may be employed in combination
with other cryptanalytic methods to handle these situations as well.
5.1 GFSGA applied to single-output nonlinear filter generators (m = 1)
The time complexity of GFSGA with variable sampling step is given by (7), i.e.,
T ∗Comp. = 2
n−m × 2n−m−q1 × . . .× 2n−m−qc∗−1 × L3,
and clearly when m = 1 the complexity becomes quickly larger than the time complexity of
exhaustive search (for some common choices of the design parameters n and L). Based on
annihilators in fewer variables of a nonlinear filtering function f(x1, . . . , xn), Jiao et al. proposed
another variant of FSGA in [14]. The core idea of this attack is to reduce the size of the
preimage space via annihilators in fewer variables g1(xj1 , . . . , xjd) and g2(xj1 , . . . , xjd) such that
f(x1, . . . , xn)g1(xj1 , . . . , xjd) = 0 and (f(x1, . . . , xn)⊕1)g2(xj1 , . . . , xjd) = 0, where {j1, . . . , jd} ⊂
{1, . . . , n}. It was shown that the time complexity of this attack is given by
T∆Comp. = ||Sg1=0||
c1 × ||Sg2=0||
c2 × Lω,
where ||Sgi=0||, for i = 1, 2, is the size of preimage space of the annihilator gi (restricted to the
variables {j1, . . . , jd}), c
∗ = ⌈L
d
⌉ is the number of sampling steps, c∗ = c1 + c2 and ω = log2 7 ≈
2.807 is the exponent of Gaussian elimination. In [14], it was also shown that this variant of
FSGA could be applied to single-output filter generators. For instance, letting L = 87 and using
a nonlinear Boolean functions f(x1, . . . , x6) as in “Example 2” in [14], it was demonstrated that
the time complexity of this attack is only about 280 operations, whereas the time complexity of
FSGA is about 287 operations in [14].
In a similar manner, the same approach leads to a reduction of time complexity when GF-
SGA with variable sampling step is considered. For instance, let the set of tap positions be
given by I0 = s
t1 = {1, 6, 19, 26, 52, 63} corresponding to the inputs {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6}, re-
spectively. Using the filtering function f : F62 → F2 of “Example 2” in [14], one can deduce
that ||Sg1(x2,x4,x6)=0|| = ||Sg2(x2,x4,x6)=0|| = 5. Actually, we can only consider the tap positions
{6, 26, 63} with full positive difference set {20, 37}. Moreover, let us use the variable sampling
steps σi = 20 and σi+1 = 37, alternately. In such a case, the preimage space of annihilator can
be further reduced to ||S∗
g1(x2,x4,x6)=0
|| = ||S∗
g2(x2,x4,x6)=0
|| ≈ 2.5 by using the repeated bits. The
time complexity of GFSGA with variable sampling steps is about 5×2.542×872.807 ≈ 276.32 < 280
operations. In particular, the number of variable sampling points is 43 since at the first sampling
point 3 linear relations are obtained and the remaining 42 sampling points give 2×42 = 84 linear
relations, thus in total 3 + 84 = 87 = L linear equations are derived. It directly means that our
GFSGA with variable sampling step outperforms the variant of FSGA in [14].
Due to the small sized parameters L and n the above example does not illustrate a full
potential of using GFSGA in cryptanalysis of single-output filtering generators. Its purpose is
rather to show that GFSGA and its variants can be efficiently combined with other cryptanalytic
methods. The most promising approach seems to be an interaction of GFSGA with algebraic
attacks using small degree annihilators of restrictions of the filtering function f . Indeed, the use
of repeated bits not only reduces the preimage space it essentially also fixes a subset of input
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variables and therefore these restrictions of f may have annihilators of very low degree. This
implies the existence of additional low degree equations in state bits which may be either used
for checking the consistency of the linear system and after all (for sufficiently large number of
fixed variables) these equations become linear. It is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate
further the performance of this combined method but we believe that this kind of attack may
become efficient against single-output filter generators with standard choice of the parameters
L and n.
5.2 Applying GFSGA to NFSR-based ciphers
A current tendency in the design of stream ciphers, motivated by efficient hardware implemen-
tation, is the use of NFSRs in combination with (rather simple) nonlinear filtering function. For
instance, this idea was employed in the design of the famous stream ciphers Trivium [7] and
Grain family [2]. Apparently, none of the GFSGA variants can be applied for recovering the
initial state of these ciphers but rather for deducing certain internal state of the cipher. In this
scenario, the complexity of GFSGA is directly related to the complexity of solving an overde-
fined system of low degree equations rather than a system of linear equations. More precisely,
assuming that the length of NFSR is L bits, the algebraic degree of its update function is r, and
the filtering function F : GF (2)n → GF (2)m, then the time complexity of GFSGA is given by
T ∗∗Comp. = 2
n−m × 2n−m−q1 × . . . × 2n−m−qc∗−1 ×Dω, (12)
where D =
∑e×r
i=0
(
L
i
)
, ω = 2.807 is the coefficient of Gaussian elimination, c∗ is the number of
sampling steps, and e is closely related to the parameters n,m,L, c∗ and specified tap positions.
The complexity being much larger than for LFSR-based ciphers, due to the term Dω, makes
GFSGA methods practically inefficient.
However, one may mount another mode of internal state recovery attack which employs the
GFSGA sampling procedure, but without solving systems of equations at all. More precisely,
this new type of internal state recovery attack also employs the sampling of outputs within a
certain sampling window which then allows us to efficiently recover a certain portion of internal
state bits from the reduced preimage spaces corresponding to the observed outputs. To describe
the attack in due detail, let us denote by p the distance between the last entry of NFSR (where
NFSR is updated) and the tap position closest to this registry cell. We assume that this distance
satisfies the inequality (p − 1) × n > L, where n is the number of inputs (tap positions) of a
filtering function F : Fn2 → Fm. Note that this condition implies that either p or n are relatively
large. In such a case, let us choose the constant sampling steps σi = 1, for i = 1, . . . , p − 1,
and assume the adversary can directly recover, say Rp internal state bits (in total), at these
p − 1 sampling instances. The remaining L − Rp internal state bits are still unknown and the
adversary can exhaustively guess these bits to recover the whole internal state. The process of
identifying the correct internal state is as follows. For each possible internal state candidate,
a portion of L keystream bits Zt = (z1, . . . , zL) at time instance t is determined using a given
encryption algorithm. Then, comparing L keystream bits Z∗t = (z∗1 , . . . , z
∗
L) at time instance
t generated by the cipher (with unknown secret internal state), we can distinguish the correct
and wrong internal states by directly checking if Zt = Z∗t. In particular, if Zt = Z∗t, then the
guessed internal state would be the correct one, otherwise another internal state candidate is
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considered. Consequently, the time complexity of this internal state recovery attack, assuming
that remaining L−Rp bits are guessed, is given by
T ∗∗Comp. = 2
n−m × 2n−m−q1 × . . .× 2n−m−qp−2 × 2L−Rp . (13)
The memory complexity of this attack is only (p − 1) × n × 2n−1 + L bits, which are used to
save all the element of preimage spaces and L keystream bits.
The following example illustrates an application of this approach to an NFSR-based cipher
that largely resembles the NFSR used in the Grain-128 cipher. In particular, the process of
recovering Rp internal state bits is described more thoroughly.
Example 3 Let L = 128, n = 8,m = 1. The update function of NFSR is defined below (a
slightly modified variant of the NFSR used in Grain-128 [2] without cubic and quartic terms):
bt+128 = 1⊕ bt ⊕ bt+26 ⊕ bt+56 ⊕ bt+91 ⊕ bt+96 ⊕ bt+3bt+67 ⊕ bt+11bt+13
⊕bt+17bt+18 ⊕ bt+27bt+59 ⊕ bt+40bt+48 ⊕ bt+61bt+65 ⊕ bt+68bt+84.
The set of tap positions which we consider is given by I0 = s
t1 = {l1, . . . , l8} = {1, 7, 21, 26, 52, 67,
89, 105}, and it corresponds to a full positive difference set {6, 14, 5, 26, 15, 22, 16}. The distance
between the last tap position and the NFSR update position is p = 128 − 105 = 23. This means
that if we consider an updated internal state bit (the first nonlinear bit) and constant sampling
rate σi = 1, this bit will appear at the tap position after 23 sampling instances. At the same
time, employing the fact that many of these bits appear at some tap positions (thus using the
idea of GFSGA), the adversary directly obtains many bits corresponding to 128-bit internal state
as follows:
1. By relation (5) and sampling steps described in Section 3, collecting all repeated bits over
p−1 observed outputs (which are on consecutive distances σi = 1), we determine all preimage
spaces Swti (i = 1, . . . , p− 1) and their sizes.
2. Our approach implies that at the sampling instance i we recover (essentially guess) n − qi
internal state bits which must match to one of the 2n−qi−1 preimages. It is important to
note that the bits which come from preimage spaces are the only candidates to be an internal
state of the registry, since they are precisely determined by consecutive repetitions over p− 1
observed outputs.
Table 7 specifies the number of recovered internal state bits, and the sizes of corresponding
preimage spaces. Denoting by Rp the total number of recovered bits, we can see (from Table 7)
that Rp = 8+8× 4+ 7+6× 8+ 5+4+3× 6 = 122 < 128, where these bits are calculated using
(5), for σi = 1, (i = 1, · · · , 22).
The adversary can further guess the remaining L− Rp = 128 − 122 = 6 internal state bits,
and thus the time complexity, using (13), of this attack is about
T ∗∗Comp. = 2
7+7×4+6+5×8+4+3+2×6 × 26 = 2106 < 2128.
The data complexity of this attack is only about 22 + 128 = 150 keystream bits. The memory
complexity is upper bounded by 22×8×27+128 < 215 bits, which corresponds to storing at most
27 elements from preimage spaces and 128 keystream bits. The success rate is close to one since
there are 27+7×4+6+5×8+4+3+2×6+6 = 2106 internal state candidates in total and therefore only a
small portion of about 2106× 2−128 = 2−22 < 1 wrong internal state candidates can pass the test.
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Example 3 demonstrates that GFSGA-like attacks can be applied to NFSR-based stream
ciphers without employing any structural properties of the filtering function. The following
Table 7: Recovered bits obtained by sampling step σi = 1
i Recovered bits of internal state qi The size of preimage space
1 8 0 27
2 8 0 27
3 8 0 27
4 8 0 27
5 7 1 26
6 6 2 25
7 6 2 25
8 6 2 25
9 6 2 25
10 6 2 25
11 6 2 25
12 6 2 25
13 6 2 25
14 5 3 24
15 4 4 23
16 3 5 22
17 3 5 22
18 3 5 22
19 3 5 22
20 3 5 22
21 3 5 22
example illustrates an application of GFSGA to a hybrid NFSR/LFSR-based cipher whose
design is very similar to Grain-128 cipher. The major difference is the key length, since our
variant assumes that the key length is L = 256 bits rather than 128-bit key used in Grain-128
[2].
Example 4 Let L = 256, n = 17,m = 1. The internal state of our variant of Grain-128 consists
of one 128-bit LFSR and one 128-bit NFSR, whose state bits are denoted by (s0, · · · , s127) and
(b0, · · · , b127), respectively. Their update functions are defined respectively as follows (see also
[2]):
st+128 = st ⊕ st+7 ⊕ st+38 ⊕ st+70 ⊕ st+81 ⊕ st+96 (14)
bt+128 = st ⊕ bt ⊕ bt+26 ⊕ bt+56 ⊕ bt+91 ⊕ bt+96 ⊕ bt+3bt+67 ⊕ bt+11bt+13
⊕bt+17bt+18 ⊕ bt+27bt+59 ⊕ bt+40bt+48 ⊕ bt+61bt+65 ⊕ bt+68bt+84
For this variant of Grain-128 cipher we consider the same set of tap positions that are used in
the standard Grain-128 cipher, i.e., the tap position are A = {2, 12, 15, 36, 45, 64, 73, 89, 95} for
the NFSR and B = {8, 13, 20, 42, 60, 79, 93, 95} for the LFSR. Note that the largest tap index
in A is 95, and the NFSR is updated at position 128, i.e., their distance is p = 128 − 95 = 33.
Similarly as in Example 3, sampling at the constant rate σi = 1, Table 8 specifies the number of
recovered (repeated) bits of internal state, and the size of preimage spaces.
Thus, the adversary can directly obtain 17 + 227 = 244 < 256 internal state bits. The
remaining L−Rp = 256 − 244 = 12 internal state bits can then be guessed, which then leads to
a recovery of the whole 256-bit internal state. Therefore, the time complexity of this attack is
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Table 8: Repeated bits attained by sampling step σi = 1
i Recovered bits of internal state qi The size of preimage space
1 17 0 216
2 16 1 215
3 15 2 214
4 15 2 214
5 14 3 213
6 13 4 212
7 12 5 211
8 12 5 211
9 10 7 29
10 9 8 28
11 9 8 28
12 9 8 28
13 9 8 28
14 8 9 27
15 8 9 27
16 7 10 26
17 7 10 26
18 6 11 25
19 4 13 23
20 4 13 23
21 3 14 22
22 2 15 2
23 2 15 2
24 2 15 2
25 2 15 2
26 2 15 2
27 2 15 2
28 2 15 2
29 2 15 2
30 2 15 2
31 2 15 2∑
= 227
∏
= 2196
about
T ∗∗Comp. = 2
16+196 × 212 = 2224 < 2256.
The above example demonstrates that GFSGA-like cryptanalysis is also applicable to hy-
brid NFSR/LFSR-based ciphers. In particular, it is shown that the tap positions have a very
important impact on the security of NFSR/LFSR-based ciphers.
Remark 10 In difference to the time-memory-data trade-off attacks or algebraic attacks, this
attack has more favorable data and memory complexity. For instance, in Example 4, the data
complexity of this attack is only about 32 + 229 = 261 ≈ 28 keystream bits. Namely, in the
first step we use 32 sampling instances to determine all specified preimage spaces and their
sizes under constant sampling rate σi = 1, and in the second step we need to use about 229
fresh keystream bits to determine the correct state. Notice that the memory complexity of this
attack is only about 32 × 17 × 216 + 256 ≈ 225 bits. On the other hand, if the filtering function
is f : GF (2)17 → GF (2)m,m > 4, then the time complexity of this attack is less than 2128
operations. It implies that this attack would outperform the time-memory-data trade-off attack
for m > 4.
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5.3 Grain-128 tap selection
We have already remarked that the tap selection for both SOBER-t32 and SFINKS was not
optimal with respect to their resistance to GFSGA cryptanalysis, see also [22]. We show that
the same is true when Grain-128 is considered, thus there exist better selections that ensure
greater resistance to GFSGA-like cryptanalysis.
We assume that either LFSR or NFSR, whose tap positions are given in Example 4, of Grain-
128 are used as state registers in a filter generator and we apply different modes of GFSGA to
these schemes. In the case when the LFSR of Grain-128 is employed in such a scenario then the
complexities of the three different modes of GFSGA are given as,
Table 9: Time complexity of different modes of GFSGA on LFSR of Grain-128
TComp. T
∗
Comp.(1)
T ∗Comp.(2)
2108 2125 2118
Using our algorithm for finding a (sub)optimal placement of tap positions, instead of us-
ing the set A = {2, 12, 15, 36, 45, 64, 73, 89, 95}, we find another set of tap positions given as
{1, 16, 27, 54, 71, 95, 108, 127} which gives the following complexities,
TComp. = 2
129, T ∗Comp.(1) = 2
132, T ∗Comp.(2) = 2
123.
A similar improvement can also be achieved when the tap positions of NFSR in Grain-128 are
considered. In this case the original placement of tap positions (the set B in Example 4) gives
the following complexities,
Table 10: Time complexity of different modes of GFSGA on NFSR of Grain-128
TComp. T
∗
Comp.(1)
T ∗Comp.(2)
2114 2125 2122
On the other hand, our algorithm suggest somewhat better allocation of these taps given
by {3, 10, 29, 42, 59, 67, 88, 103, 126}, which then induces the following complexities of the three
GFSGA modes,
TComp. = 2
130, T ∗Comp.(1) = 2
139, T ∗Comp.(2) = 2
125.
6 Conclusions
In this article we have investigated the problem of selecting tap positions of the driving LFSR
used in filter generators. The importance of this problem seems to be greatly neglected by the
designers since to the best of our knowledge only some heuristic design rationales (such as the
concepts of full positive difference sets and co-primality of consecutive differences) can be found
in the literature. The algorithmic approach of selecting taps (sub)optimally given their number
and the length of LFSR appears to generate good solutions for this problems, though its further
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optimization and development may result in a better performance. Two additional modes of
GFSGA have been introduced and it turns out that these modes in many cases can outperform
the standard GFSGA mode. The idea of combining GFSGA technique and algebraic attacks
appears to be a promising unified cryptanalytic method against LFSR-based stream ciphers
though a more thorough analysis and some practical applications are needed for confirming its
full potential.
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Appendix
Since finding the preimage spaces Swti of the observed outputs w
ti is the most important part,
we give for clarity the description of a few initial steps:
Step 1: Let wt1 denotes the first observed output so that the corresponding LFSR state at
the tap positions is exactly the set I0={l1, l2, . . . , ln}, so that s
t1=(st1l1 , . . . , s
t1
ln
)
(4)
={l1, . . . , ln}, i.e.,
st1=I0. Notice that the first observed output w
t1 does not necessarily need to correspond to the
set I0, though (for simplicity) we assume this is the case. A preimage space which corresponds
to the first observed output wt1 always has the size 2n−m, i.e., |Swt1 | = 2
n−m.
Step 2: Taking the second output wt2 at distance σ1 from w
t1 (thus t2 = t1 + σ1), we are
able to identify and calculate the number of repeated bits (equations) at the time instance t2.
Using the notation above, the set I∗1 of these bits is given by the intersection:
I∗1 = s
t1 ∩ st2 = st1 ∩ {st1 + σ1} = I0 ∩ {l1 + σ1, . . . , ln + σ1},
where st2 = {st1 + σ1}
def
= (st1+σ1l1+σ1 , s
t2+σ1
l2+σ1
, . . . , stn+σ1ln+σ1 )
(4)
= {l1 + σ1, . . . , ln + σ}, i.e., s
t2 = {l1 +
σ1, . . . , ln + σ} is the LFSR state at tap positions at time instance t2. Denoting the cardinality
of I∗1 = s
t1 ∩ st2 by q1, i.e., q1 = #I
∗
1 , the cardinality of the preimage space corresponding to
the output wt2 is given as |Swt2 | = 2
n−m−q1 .
This process is then continued using the sampling distances σ2, . . . , σc∗ until the condition
nc∗−R∗ > L is satisfied, where the total number of repeated equations over c∗ observed outputs
is R∗ =
∑c∗−1
k=1 qk. Note that the number of repeated equations corresponding to the first output
is 0, since the corresponding LFSR state st1 is the starting one. Therefore the sum goes to c∗−1.
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